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Research on the High-Skilled Labor and Identity Construction of Video Creative Workers

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KEYWORDS

ABSTRACT

Why are mid-video creative workers willing to produce content on Bilibili even if the earnings are not high? This is the starting point of research thinking. This paper takes the cultural production practice of UP hosts as an example and finds that the platform attempts to eliminate the instability of labor through control strategies such as interface design, creation incentives, algorithmic streaming, and incubating accounts. The "high skill" of creative work and the non-standardization of the production model explain both the endogenous logic of the platform's "income does not cover income" and the premise of creators' "consent" for generating "love". The high threshold of users' consumption of video forces creators to "compete" in skills, highlighting the subjectivity of workers while forming "identity games", a form of labor control that is different from the previous "de-skillization". The labor-capital conflict conceals the "symbiotic relationship" of checks and dependencies among platforms, creators and users, which not only weakens the degree of labor control of platform capital, but also provides implications for understanding the diversified platform ecosystem and expanding the theory of the labor process.

INTRODUCTION

With the development of information and communication technology, China's online screen industry has shifted from "streaming media" dominated by iQIYI, Youku and Tencent Video to short-video platforms such as Douyin and Kuaishou. bilibili (B Station) focuses on high-quality horizontal medium videos within 1 to 30 minutes and uses a composite production model (PUGC) that combines user and professional attributes, while enriching the types of platform economy, compared with the "short, flat and fast" fast food videos, It promotes the emergence of new labor fields, production methods, and labor organization forms.[1] Xiao Zhang, the interviewee, is a full-time platform content creator who is paid for his creativity and is regarded as a "creative class" that is good at expressing self-worth. However,[2] the "80/20 rule" of uneven resource distribution has led to poor earnings for some creators, Xiao Zhang said:

> *Bilibili has cut its incentives for creation, and I missed the golden period of making money. A video with three million views actually earned*

around 3,000 yuan, far lower than the amount before it was "cut". My strength lies in my hand-drawn skills. Since I can only produce one video a month, getting over 10,000 views depends entirely on luck. (A5)

The author conducted months of participatory observations on Bilibili and found that the majority of creators did not abandon the platform because of salary mismatch. Bilibili remains the main camp for their video creation. The collective pay cuts have disrupted the balance of income and expenditure, and the platform's capital has occupied the surplus value generated by the production of videos without compensation, which can't help but make one think about the reasons and processes behind the creation of "consent".

Marx's theory of the labor process holds that capitalists must have control over the labor process of workers in order to exert labor potential, and thus labor control becomes a fundamental issue[3] in the study of the labor process. Unlike the direct control of capital, Brovey in "Manufacturing Consent" points out that capitalists should use the "rush game" to subdue and neutralize workers' resistance[4], and by participating in the game to compete for more material rewards, make them voluntarily participate in the exploited workplace in order to achieve labor consent. Labor control on Internet platforms encompasses ideological control, time control, flow control, and social relationship control[5], but most studies anchor workers as victims of exploitation, overemphasizing the negative effects of digital labor, and the absence of worker subjectivity leads to biased criticism of labor-capital relations. In addition, the increasing commercialization of user-generated content and the concept of a "creator economy" built around the creation, distribution, and monetization of digital content have become new perspectives for analyzing digital labor,[6] with creators and users being two key actors.[7]

This paper follows the basic thread of the labor process theory and, in light of the current situation of Bilibili's platform economy development under the flexible employment model, explores the basic methods of labor control on the mid-video platform and the individual experience of workers. By examining the power game among the platform, creators and users in the creative labor process, it is hoped to explain the internal logic of "willing to work despite spending more than one's income"

and provide possibilities for enriching labor relations on Internet platforms.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Empowerment and Exploitation: Platformization of Cultural Content Production

Platform-based companies develop their own businesses and markets[8] by configuring infrastructure to provide customers with a range of tools and services, and products and services can be modified, recreated and redistributed[9] based on platform technology, that is, "platformization". Creators are moving from traditional streaming to emerging creative forms[10] such as short videos and live streaming, as they encourage users to actively engage in content production and allow them to earn money through low-cost means like replicating styles or content transfer. Some scholars affirm the empowerment advantage of platforms in breaking down the discourse barriers of traditional media, arguing that content creators have gone beyond the passive "production-consumer" model. Douyin, for example, turned grassroots people living outside the city center into "unlikely" creative workers[11], enhanced their sense [12]of well-being and fulfillment in life and work, and pushed the platformization process [13]by building "hope labour" This shows that user-friendly platform infrastructure and business models do bring hope and opportunity to the mobile youth.[14] In addition to catering to the nation's "entrepreneurial solutionism" proposition, creators[15] can also play a consultative role in platform governance, highlighting the positive impact of platform technology in creating social value.

Critical scholars, however, point out that the relationship between platform giants and creators is highly disproportionate[16], using the superficial features of participatory culture to mask the essence of "exploitation" and complete the primitive accumulation[17] of platform capitalism while seizing the labor value of creators and users. Although Kuaishou has created an entrepreneurial fantasy of upward mobility, the hope labor practiced by rural migrant youth on the platform remains uncertain. Not only is it difficult to realize the "boss dream" of the creative class, but it also accelerates the homogenization[18] of content production on the platform. To eliminate the uneven distribution caused by the platform economy, a mutually beneficial and win-win YPP (Youtube Partner Program)

was developed to distinguish YouTube from other social media platforms. The scheme challenges the platform's status as a free labor explosor,[19] but YPP members will be deprived of the right to monetize their content as long as there are enough creators willing to do free labor,[20] indicating that the platform still holds the authority to limit the range of action of creators. The exploitation of Internet platforms is not as blatant as in traditional industries. Even if the value they create is not proportional to their actual income, users have difficulty recognizing the exploitation they have suffered, and some may even "not know that his or her activities have created wealth for a small number of people." [21] Why are creators willing to upload their content for free? How their labor is controlled by the platform is a question worthy of further exploration.

Labor Control and "Consent" Manufacturing in the Internet Entertainment Industry

Technology and labor constitute two major aspects of the study of platforms in the field of journalism and communication, among which three paths involving digital labor are: platform employment models, labor processes, and digital supervision[22]. The platform economy has shifted the employment model from the traditional direct employment by signing labor contracts to the informal employment form of "on-demand employment" and has permeated the leisure and entertainment industry, resulting in greater uncertainty [23]in the labor process and the labor market. Compared with new forms of workers in the gig economy of the service industry such as couriers, food delivery riders, ride-hailing drivers and domestic service workers, workers who carry out creative production of cultural content through digital platforms have a higher level of mental skills, and the flexible and elastic working mechanism gives these entities the title of "[24]digital smart workers".

The trading of labor force is a characteristic of capitalist production. How do capitalists transform the purchased labor force into actual and effective labor? Marx's theory of the labor process provides the answer of "control," by obtaining coercive control rights to eliminate labor instability and thereby establish an unjust labor order. Blovey, however, believes it is necessary to break the generality and one-sidedness perspective beyond history in industrial sociology and organizational theory, and to abandon the binary opposition of "potential harmony" and "social control". He incorporated worker subjectivity into the analysis of labor control, using the concept of the "rush game" to refer to the "soft control mechanism" by which capital occupies the workers' surplus value, in order to explain the workers' motivation to work hard. The gamification of the labor process gives a competitive element to work, and workers gain respect, self-satisfaction and self-control by completing excess production tasks, thus ignoring concern about the poor working environment, "not only reproducing 'spontaneous enslavement', but also generating more material wealth"[25]. After that, concepts such as "gender games", "transparency games", "chair-snatching games", "boss games"[26], and "ideal games" [27] have emerged.

In short video or live streaming platforms, factors such as ideology, organization and technology[28], wage [29]systems and emotional labor [30]are all means of criticizing capital for controlling labor. Interest and freedom have obscured the essence of labor alienation, neoliberal work ethics have rationalized self-exploitation, and have captured the subject consciousness and consp[31]ired with capital. YouTube, a foreign mid-video platform, has been pointed out by researchers that creative workers attempt to transform into "non-alienated labor," and ultimately cannot escape being incorporated[32] into capital. However, the workers' "consent" to the platform's control is not absolute. The practice of resistance is the workers' voice[33] against the injustice of their working conditions. Existing studies have clearly ignored the shaping of workers' subjectivity and the observation of their identity recognition. The emotional labor of workers in digital media practice may also be a process of self-satisfaction and self-enjoyment of the labor subject, [34] although the presentation and elevation of subjectivity are limited.

In the context of platform-based cultural production, the institutional structure is embedded with the social experiences of producers and consumers, and the construction of the subjectivity of digital labor needs to be discussed[35] in the grand "socio-cultural" context. In addition, the unique attributes of the platform itself should also be considered as elements of the employment model and platform operation mechanism, and the technical devices, dissemination effects and monetization channels of videos in Bilibili are worthy of discussion. The author believes that the existing theory cannot explain the labor process of mid-video creative workers. We need to reflect on the extent to which the traditional "control/resistance" frame-

Table 1 | Information of the interviewed UP hosts

Number	Gender	Form of work	Number of fans	Video genre	Occupation	Interview duration
A1	male	Full-time	263,000	Random Talk on Animation	Freelancing	100 minutes
A2	male	Full-time	118,000	Comic Chat	Freelancing	80 minutes
A3	female	Full-time	61,000	Female character mix-up	Freelancing	80 minutes
A4	male	Full-time	47,000	Anime remix	Freelancing	70 minutes
A5	male	Full-time	25,000	Song Hand-drawn	Freelancing	90 minutes
A6	male	Part-time	595,000	Game Appreciation	Students	100 minutes
A7	male	Part-time	14,000	Biography Commentary	Students	90 minutes
A8	female	Part-time	11,000	Work Analysis	Employees of private enterprises	80 minutes
A9	male	Part-time	7765	Comic book of Anime Boys	Freelancer	90 minutes
A10	female	Part-time	7074	TV or film characters or couples	Students	100 minutes
A11	female	Part-time	5296	Film and television makeup and styling commentary	Students	90 minutes
A12	female	Part-time	2198	Chinese comic couple	Employees of state-owned enterprises	70 minutes
A13	female	Part-time	820	TV or film characters or couples	Students	90 minutes
A14	female	Part-time	733	Chinese comic songs	Employees of private enterprises	80 minutes
A15	male	Part-time	519	Childhood works collection	Government agencies	80 minutes

work is suitable for digital labor at this stage and expand the theory based on new empirical phenomena. Focusing on the labor process within the content production field, this paper attempts to respond to the question: How do mid-video platforms create labor "consent" in the absence of guaranteed economic benefits? How do creative workers understand the role expectations as "UP hosts"? What impact will the production methods and employment patterns of mid-video platforms have on shaping labor relations?

RESEARCH METHODS

This paper draws on a number of publicly available data sources, including corporate official websites and business analysis reports. Fifteen UP hosts[36] (codes A1-A15, see **Table 1**) were recruited online for in-depth interviews about their behind-the-scenes creative experience and salary status. Additionally, three senior users (codes B1-B3) and two Bilibili employees (codes C1-C2) were interviewed to assist with their viewpoints. The in-

terviews took place from March to July 2023. Subsequently, about hundreds of thousands of words of written materials were sorted out to extract core topics and concepts for analyzing phenomena and conducting theoretical generalizations.

CREATIVE "RUSHING WORK": ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR LABOR CONTROL IN PLATFORM LAYOUT

Interface Design for the "Private Domain Reach" of Mid-Video

The platform is regarded as a complex "social-technology" combination,[37] and mid-video is the result of labor as an artifact, which is reflected in Bilibili's product design rules. The platform's recommendation page and partitioned video display is a "double-column waterfall flow", where users have to click into the private domain to watch the video, unlike the single-column auto-play of browsing up and down on short-video platforms. The former has the opportunity to direct users to the

private domain traffic pool of UP hosts, promoting interaction between the two and reflecting the community attribute in the design concept, while the latter is more inclined to bring public domain traffic to the platform.

The private domain reach of mid-video forces creators to work hard on visual elements such as video covers, titles, and tags to increase the likelihood of their videos being clicked by more users within the public domain traffic pool. Secondly, "the first 15 seconds of the video" is also an important indicator of quality mid-length videos. UP owners need to ensure that they can quickly capture the audience's preferences within the limited time, otherwise they will lose the best video completion effect and significantly reduce the video revenue. However, when Posting videos, creators are also subject to specification restrictions. The product's "part" upload feature forces them to break down a long narrative video into several mid-length videos, making the user viewing experience fragmented. This not only affects the fans' viewing experience but also reduces the popularity of the video push.

Incentives for creation that cede labor supervision powers

Bilibili has established a relatively mature incentive mechanism and algorithmic push system. Through data analysis,[38] it screens out high-quality video content and effectively delivers it to target consumers. To apply for the "bilibili Creation Incentive Program", UP owners need to meet the conditions of having a creativity or influence score[39] of 55 electromagnetic force and a credit score of no less than 80. [40] The platform will calculate the incentive earnings [41] based on factors such as content popularity, user preference, and content verticality. The daily earnings generated by the articles will be calculated and displayed by the system two days later. It is understood that the video incentive consists of two parts: the basic subsidy (the data performance of the article) and the activity subsidy (items such as the small target of the hit, the fan growth challenge, etc.). Although the platform did not explicitly state the calculation rules for the incentive amount, many UP owners inferred that it was closely related to indicators such as likes, coins, collections, views and completion rates, and increasing the data volume of "triple click" became an important basis for increasing revenue.

By using clickbait tactics to boost play counts, the number of likes and collections failed to keep up, and the income was not high. The *likes and collections need to account for 40% of the views, and the views of passers-by in the completion rate should be higher than those of fans in order to increase the overall revenue of the video. (A2)*

Seeing users as customers who "buy" goods, any trace they leave on the interface is converted into a bargaining chip for the platform to evaluate the value of the video, which gives users the right to negotiate independently in the buying and selling market. For example, coin insertion means giving "B coins" to the UP owner. Non-members can only get one coin a day, and each triple insertion consumes two coins. Therefore, coin insertion is an affirmation of "the best video seen in two days" by the audience. Coins cannot be exchanged for RMB, but when it comes to creative incentives, they have to "compete" for creativity just to win users' voluntary coin insertion.

Viewers are not too averse to the UP's "eating", but your eating style can't be too ugly. Do not imitate fast food culture when making mid-length videos. If you choose to make money at the expense of quality, it will be very difficult for this person to survive on Bilibili. After all, no viewer is willing to "pay". (A9)

Bilibili has not followed the "traffic is king" operation approach of short-video platforms, valuing user likes far more than clicks, indicating that unique creativity and excellent skills are the only rules for creators to attract viewers and establish themselves on the platform. The multi-element coupled creation incentive system is so complex that it has transformed users from entertainment "viewers" to "supervisors" who can review the value of videos, making them unintentionally "accomplices" in the platform's capital control of labor. The direct link of "triple click" to creative incentives ostensibly gives users the right to judge quality content, but in reality, it builds a reputation-oriented "consumer rating mechanism" that conceals the intention of supervising creators' labor and strengthening "liquid control" of creative skills.

Algorithmic manipulation of the "black box" of traffic push

The platform's technical unconsciousness features contribute to the ability[42] to collect metadata on user preferences, topic choices, interaction patterns, etc. Algorithms are considered to be at the core [43] of the technical unconsciousness, helping to connect and interpret user metadata and reveal

user behavior patterns. Most users are manipulated by algorithms to converge on a certain video, and creators try to increase exposure in the public domain traffic pool, but a large number of respondents, through long-term research, still found that whether a video appears in the recommended column of the audience is rather random, and fans may also be blocked by the platform for update prompts of the subscription channel. Given the risk of traffic limits and fan stickiness, many UP owners have to consistently produce videos of the same type, leading to a stereotyped style.

Provide operational strategies for incubating accounts

Bilibili is similar to a large MCN agency that nurses influencers and has the ability to incubate personality ips. Creators rely on the platform's operational strategies to incubate their accounts into recognizable influencer personas. In terms of operations, Bilibili has built the "Huahuo" commercial platform that links UP hosts with advertisers for resource transactions, and uses big data to provide creators with system quotation references, order process management, platform security settlement and other functions[44]. Because both the entry threshold and the commercial order price are positively correlated with the number of followers, the actual earnings of UP owners are not high.

To help new accounts gain followers quickly, Bilibili has launched the "Takeoff Plan"[45], a content promotion heating tool that precisely promotes native content to the target user group and increases exposure. The increase in traffic does not drive the simultaneous increase in the data volume of "triple click", and the benefits of purchasing traffic are not as significant as those of short-video platforms. For creators with a small fan base, private deals with advertising agencies were originally an alternative option, but such videos are often restricted by platforms, reducing their monetization value.

SKILL IS KING: THE INHERENT LOGIC OF MAKING VIDEOS WITH TWICE THE EFFORT FOR HALF THE RESULT

The "High Skill" of Creative Work Increases Production Costs

Due to the lack of a systematic commercial infrastructure, Bilibili has repeatedly hit a wall in its exploration of a [46]"de-2D" commercial path, with a persistently low return on investment (ROI) and still incurring losses since its listing. The platform's control strategy, which prioritizes originality and creativity, has undoubtedly raised the threshold for video creation, forcing a "high-skilled" trend in the content production process of mid-video and making it difficult for the platform to make profits. The "high skill" of creative work has a negative impact on the platform economy. On the one hand, mid-length videos have higher production costs in collecting materials, writing scripts, shooting and editing than short videos, and the advertising unit price is also relatively higher, greatly reducing advertisers' willingness to invest; On the other hand, it raises the threshold for users to consume high-quality video content, and they are averse to copying and following the trend. To stabilize the user base, the platform knew that increasing production costs would reduce advertising investment, but still had to ask UP hosts to improve their skills.

To ease the economic pressure, Bilibili launched Story-Mode vertical short videos, a way to replicate Douyin's creative style, which was seen as losing the point and was resisted by users and creators who believed that only by focusing on vertical content could the platform leverage its advantages. Embarrassingly, Bilibili's share of the lower-tier market is not large enough to monopolize all mid-video resources and has to compromise with users' demand for creative skills. In order not to break its promise of never adding pre-roll ads, Bilibili relies on value-added services (including live streaming, premium membership and other value-added services) to generate revenue, which is just a drop in the bucket to cover the company's expenses, let alone share the profits of creators and the platform. The short-video industry has now turned to a competition for user base, but Bilibili still seeks to increase its user base to expand its market share and brand value, which may be a compromise for the company that neither wants to lose a large number of users nor go bankrupt.

The Non-Standardized Production Model Reduces Production Efficiency

Machines have replaced manual tools, and workers are required to be concentrated in factories for mass production labor. This monotonous and repetitive work has reduced workers' initiative and creativity, and "de-skillization" has deprived them of control[47] over the labor process, forcing them to be alienated [48]from the products of labor. When workers are removed from the assembly line, they do not have complete skills to achieve mass production, which intensifies the alienated

feeling of being exploited by capital and further leads to the result of "labor degradation".

When enterprises monopolize core technologies, they no longer need to rely on individual uniqueness to create value. The addiction to short videos reveals the control logic of platforms over creators and users. At its core, it is because the substitutability of creativity is too strong[49]. Douyin simplifies the operations of shooting, editing and uploading videos, which can easily breed forms such as hitching on hot topics, copying and collage, and the production scale leads to uneven quality of video content. In contrast, Bilibili's production process must be personalized according to user demands. The emphasis on the non-standardization of content production has led the platform to form a production model similar to a workshop, resulting in low production efficiency, and the reduction in corporate profits is bound to affect the income of creators.

LABORER SUBJECTIVITY: "CONSENTING" MANUFACTURING FOR "LOVE"

Individual Desires Induce Self-Discipline

The platform, as the entity implementing labor control, has adopted a series of covert strategies aimed at stabilizing the high technical level of mid-video content production, but has fallen into the predicament of high cost and low yield. Even so, there are still a large number of UP owners willing to stay on Bilibili. What makes their "consent"? Generally speaking, the "rush game" holds that the consent of workers is equally important in explaining the question of "why work hard",[50] and Blovey believes that what stimulates workers is not only the external temptation of money, but also the internal incentives such as prestige.[51]

Autonomy of Destiny

Internet platforms, with their flexibility and autonomy in working hours, locations, and methods, attract a large number of digital workers who are eager to find a free job on the platform and avoid boss scolding and performance tasks while earning a decent income. As they are not bound by company labor contracts, creators do not have to "give way" to annoying immediate bosses or coordinate relationships with colleagues they do not want to associate with. They become masters of their own destiny, and their status has risen from employee to boss. The pursuit of the "boss dream" of "my life is in my own hands, not theirs" constitutes the idea that creators "agree" that wages do not match labor costs.

Pursuit of honor

The two-way interaction among community members creates emotional connections, allowing the emotional labor of creators to unlock the potential[52] of laborer subjectivity from the "gift economy" to a great extent. Fans who follow the account are generally more loyal, and in addition to watching updated videos on a daily basis, fans also maintain the image and reputation of their favorite UPS. In the event of someone copying or plagiarizing the creator's ideas, the public relations crisis is dealt with collectively by arguing, reporting and blacklisting.

Rise to a higher class

"Generating electricity for love" requires "feeding oneself", so it is important[53] to assess the risks of "investing" in desired labor. Take part-time UP hosts as an example. They are mostly students who choose to learn and practice video editing skills on Bilibili out of interest, and this self-media experience can enrich the job application resume and increase the social capital of the applied position. This kind of labor motivated by improving employment competitiveness is endowed with the expectation of class mobility.

Resistance and Compromise Collude To Weave the "Identity Game"

Some UP owners say they can resist the platform's control, such as using cross-platform advertising to increase their income, then not signing a contract with Bilibili, and even directly turning off the creation incentive function without deliberately pursuing data and traffic monetization. To reconcile the mental imbalance caused by creative work, some creators separate online from real life and hide their identities as platform workers on social networks to avoid others' comments on the labor process of self-media. Opening a secondary account on Bilibili not only helps you get rid of the burden of being an idol, but also avoids the "black history" controversy caused by random comments on public accounts. In fact, the above-mentioned resistance actions are just scratching the surface for exploitation. When creators examine the impact of exploitation on themselves, they directly say that the positive effects of the platform far outweigh the negative ones. Although the rules set by Bilibili have exploited their surplus value and they

have complained about the platform's injustice, they still hope that Bilibili will have better development in the future.

> I think I'm being "monopolized" by Bilibili, and the essence is that there's no choice. Because I know that if I leave Bilibili, the content I create won't be able to find the right nurturing soil, so why leave? It is Bilibili that gives us a stage to showcase our talents, and it is a challenge to win applause here. (A9)

This mechanism that inadvertently creates "consent" can be summarized as an "acceptance game," as a psychological balancing mechanism that couples resistance and compromise emotions. Creators' reliance on the platform stems from the affirmation of their identity and self-worth, deepening their professional identity by uniting the "imagined community", and the support of fans and users makes them hope to receive more praise, recognition and appreciation. Once UP owners start to do things by pleasing others' expectations, they will develop a "endorsing" mentality of "vouching for others" and subconsciously view the platform as a sanctuary to showcase their talents. "Identity game" is not a utilitarian rush. It refers to a state where creators voluntarily carry character expectations and do their best to produce quality content to give back to users. In order to earn revenue and gain recognition at the same time, they will carry the dream of pursuing what they love and practice the cultural production of "generating electricity for love" on the platform.

"Identity games" mask the pay inequality caused by platform control in the labor process and are labor consent created by workers in the race where skills are king. Bilibili adheres to a non-standardized production model and a "high-skilled" creative principle, which makes it impossible for mid-video to mass-standardize and replicate styles and content, and the high cost of video has led to a deadlock in the platform economy. The fact that UP owners are willing to stay on the platform knowing they are being exploited is the result of seeking recognition. They attract users' appreciation and pursuit by improving their skills, a spiritual value that other video platforms do not have, and the reason why the "recognition game" is created.

AFTERTHOUGHT: THE "SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP" HIDDEN BENEATH THE LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT

Labor-capital conflicts constitute conflicts of interest in the content production process, which are reflected in the unbalanced power relationship between content creators and enterprises providing platform infrastructure. Businesses rely on the output of content creators to add value to their products or services and attract other businesses to advertise on the platform to earn fees, but monetization schemes stop creators from providing free labor for social media services. The pursuit of high skills in mid-video leads to high costs. The platform still needs high-quality creative content to attract more users to increase the base of revenue, and creators also need to use the platform to gain user recognition. Thus, the existence of "identity games" enables creators to be willing to "generate electricity for love".

Fox believes that social media services are places to exploit free labor, creating tensions[54] of empowerment and dependence among various subjects, and if creators refuse to upload content, business operations may come to a [55]standstill. The "dead end" of mid-video profits forces platforms, creators and users to maintain a state of mutual restraint and shared fate, where each subject is empowered and dependent, shaping a "symbiotic relationship" like that of a crocodile and a toothpick bird, in which neither side can have a monopoly position, and the control of platform capital over workers will be greatly weakened. This is different from previous discussions and studies on the "de-skill-ization" of the labor process. The "symbiotic relationship" view reasonably explains the conflict of interests hidden beneath the unstable and unbalanced labor-capital contradiction and expands the conclusion of labor control for creative workers in informal employment.

The research also has limitations, and there is relatively little description of the unstructured "fan-master" relationship formed between UP hosts and users. Bilibili does not have a group chat function. Some creators will mark QQ group numbers and other social media information on their personal homepages with the aim of maintaining the healthy development of the "fan-master" relationship, and community building can be a way to solve this problem. This is because the community is the cornerstone of maintaining the platform's ecosystem, as the slogan "All the videos you're interested

in are on Bilibili" describes, the community, interests and ideals shape the unique spiritual and cultural values that set creators apart from other video platforms. In addition, Chen Rui, chairman and CEO of Bilibili, has set a goal[56] to break even in 2024, which can then focus on innovative business models in the platform economy and discuss the social media services provided by Internet industry giants through case studies. Further explore the impact of short videos and mid-video on labor control in areas such as flexible employment and enterprise management on the platform, and consider issues such as how to encourage multiple entities to participate in value co-creation through behavioral mechanisms.

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