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Bargaining Power and Market Turning of Export-Oriented Firms in the Context of Anti-Globalization

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*Firms' Bargaining Power;
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Market Shifts;
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ABSTRACT

Against the background of reverse globalization and the new development pattern, to address the market strategy choice problem of Chinese export-oriented enterprises, this paper takes the supply chain bargaining power as the entry point to construct a theoretical framework of corporate bargaining power and market steering. It argues that bargaining power leads to the differentiated market steering behavior of Chinese export-oriented enterprises. Based on the above logic, the analysis of empirical data from Chinese export-oriented firms from 2009 to 2020 reveals that: corporate bargaining power has a positive relationship with the market steering of export-oriented firms; the impact of bargaining power on the market steering of export-oriented firms is enhanced in both cases of a larger institutional distance ratio and non-state-owned firms. The findings of this paper enrich the research results on reverse internationalization of firms and are also instructive for the dual-cycle strategy currently being implemented by the Chinese government.

1. Introduction

Under the new development pattern of dual circulation, China's vast domestic market demand and scale have become a strategic opportunity for the high-end development of export-oriented enterprises (Ouyang et al., 2023). Since the reform and opening up, driven by globalization, Chinese export-oriented enterprises have rapidly integrated into the global economic system by relying on the "international cycle." However, they have also been locked into the low-end segments of the global value chain, placing them in a passive position within the global division of labor system. In recent years, with the exhaustion of globalization dividends and the rise of nationalism and anti-globalization trends, coupled with the severe disruption of global industrial and supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, countries have begun to focus on domestic market development and reduce their depen-

dence on international markets (Li, 2022). At the same time, China has proposed a strategic plan to accelerate the construction of a new development pattern centered on dual circulation. It has formed a super-large domestic market, which is also the world's largest and most promising consumer market, with a complete industrial chain. China is the only country in the world with all industrial categories listed in the United Nations Industrial Classification, encompassing 41 major industrial categories, 207 medium industrial categories, and 666 minor industrial categories (Liu & Huang, 2022). The complete industrial system has become an important foundation for Chinese export-oriented enterprises to expand their home market. Leveraging the advantages of the domestic market is also an objective requirement for constructing a new development pattern where the domestic macro-cycle serves as the main body, and the domestic and international dual cycles mutually

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reinforce each other (Ouyang et al., 2023). Against the backdrop of reverse globalization and the dual circulation development pattern, which export-oriented enterprises will shift their focus to the home market? And what factors influence Chinese export-oriented enterprises in developing their home markets?

The persistent technological blockade and evolving trade frictions imposed by Western countries have led to a serious imbalance in the supply and demand matching of certain segments of China's industrial supply chains, exacerbating the risks of "supply chain disruptions" and "chain breaks." This has placed tremendous pressure on the upstream factor markets of the supply chain. Since the reform and opening up, the efficiency-oriented configuration of supply chains has fully utilized the advantages of specialization and division of labor. However, the outsourcing of multiple links (such as R&D, production, procurement, and IT) has not only resulted in a high concentration of upstream suppliers but also led to a lack of supply chain resilience. For example, Huawei's high dependence on chip suppliers has placed it in a passive position under the U.S. technology blockade. Currently, most Chinese export-oriented enterprises' competitive advantages are skewed toward low value-added segments such as processing and assembly. They heavily rely on international suppliers for core technologies and key components, revealing shortcomings in R&D and technical capabilities. Trade frictions and technological blockades have made it more difficult for enterprises to access high-end resources and knowledge. If an enterprise also lacks bargaining power in the downstream market of the supply chain, its profit margins will inevitably be compressed. Therefore, it is necessary to exercise greater caution to avoid the risk contagion caused by supplier crises (Bao et al., 2023). This paper argues that export-oriented enterprises lacking bargaining power should seize the opportunity presented by the home market to achieve strategic transformation. By leveraging the super-large domestic market to reconstruct the downstream supply chain, even if the upstream supply chain faces embargoes, the pressure from the upstream factor market can be mitigated by adjusting product prices (Xu & Wang, 2013).

Existing studies have emphasized the significant influence of the home market on the development of internationalized enterprises in emerging market countries (Luo & Witt, 2021). However, for export-oriented enterprises that have long been embedded in international markets, it is difficult for them to disembed due to "inertia" and "path dependence." Based on data from 414 Chinese export-oriented enterprises from 2009 to 2020, it was found that 49.19% of enterprises chose to disembed from international markets and engage in the home market, indicating that nearly half of the enterprises opted to shift their focus to the domestic market (Wu et al., 2023). The dual-loop springboard theory highlights the significant value of multinational enterprises from emerging economies adopting home market strategies through home market relocation in the context of anti-globalization. However, further empirical research is still needed. So, which Chinese export-oriented enterprises will carry out market shifts in the

face of global trade frictions? And what are the boundary conditions? This paper takes firms' bargaining power as an entry point, constructs a theoretical framework of how bargaining power influences the market steering behavior of export-oriented enterprises, and conducts an empirical study using panel data from 336 Chinese listed export-oriented enterprises from 2009 to 2020 to promote in-depth research on home market strategies.

2. Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesis

2.1. Bargaining Power and Market Steering in Export-Oriented Firms

In a supply chain, firms' bargaining power refers to their ability to negotiate with customers, and firms that can grasp more bargaining power have stronger negotiation capabilities. Limited by data availability, this paper focuses on the bargaining power of Chinese export-oriented firms and their downstream customers in the supply chain. Reverse globalization, represented by trade frictions and technological blockades, has locked Chinese export-oriented firms at the low end of the global value chain and reduced their voice and bargaining power in the international market. Market steering refers to the behavior of shifting from dominating the international market to dominating the domestic market, taking advantage of the home market to gain higher income. It focuses on three types of action strategies: home country value chain extension (Liu, 2019), home country market expansion (Lee et al., 2018), and inward internationalization (Luo & Witt, 2021). Then, combining the unique characteristics of Chinese export-oriented enterprises and the important scenario of reverse globalization and the dual-cycle development pattern, is there a relationship between the bargaining power of Chinese export-oriented enterprises and market steering? This paper argues that when the bargaining power of Chinese export-oriented enterprises decreases, they will be more inclined to implement market steering to engage in the home market and achieve their strategic objectives.

According to resource dependence theory, enterprises need to obtain various resources from the external environment when making strategic decisions and conducting production and operational activities. The downstream customers of the supply chain are the most important resource providers for the enterprise, significantly impacting its production, operations, and financial decision-making (Zhai & Liu, 2023). Porter's Five Forces model points out that customers with higher bargaining power will lower the prices of products and services they purchase while demanding higher quality, which worsens the enterprise's performance and squeezes its profit margins, leading to a deterioration of its financial situation. As a result, firms with high customer concentration face greater business risks, resulting in insufficient cash flow earnings and exposure to a poorer external environment (Chen & Zheng, 2020). Specifically, when customers are too concentrated, the main customers hold a stronger trading position, leading to lower bargaining power for the enterprise itself. This forces the enter-

prise to reduce its profit margins and exposes it to potential business risks (Tang, 2009). Therefore, export-oriented enterprises focused on international business may change their strategies, especially under intensifying trade frictions and technological blockades. As the upstream factor markets become increasingly uncontrollable, enterprises may reduce their involvement in the international market and turn to explore the home market.

In addition, from the perspective of the precautionary motive of export-oriented firms, they may also opt for market steering. Due to the high customer concentration of export-oriented enterprises in the international market, their bargaining power is very low, placing them at a disadvantage in transaction negotiations. At this time, customers may demand more commercial credit from the enterprises, increasing their cash flow risks and capital turnover pressure, making them prone to financial difficulties. However, under the new development pattern of dual circulation, the home market has become a strategic choice for Chinese export-oriented enterprises to prevent and mitigate risks. The super-large home market not only provides resource and legitimacy advantages for export-oriented enterprises but also offers a complete industrial system and multi-level market structure, laying the foundation for them to reconstruct their supply chains. It is easier for them to find alternative customers in the home market. Therefore, this paper argues that Chinese export-oriented enterprises will tend to implement market steering and expand their home market when their bargaining power in the international market decreases. Accordingly, Hypothesis 1 is proposed:

H1: The lower the bargaining power of Chinese export-oriented firms, the higher the degree of market steering.

2.2. The Moderating Role of Institutional Distance

Traditional research has argued that the greater the institutional distance between organizations, the higher the cost of knowledge transfer and the lower the efficiency of knowledge utilization, thus weakening the market steering behavior of export-oriented firms. However, according to new institutionalism theory, the pressure of differentiated institutional fields provides opportunities for organizational strategic transformation (Wu & Zhang, 2019).

On the one hand, the dualistic and complex institutional environment of the host and home countries provides opportunities for the strategic transformation of Chinese export-oriented firms (Royston, 2010). Generally speaking, the stronger the bargaining power of an enterprise over its downstream customers in the supply chain, the lower the pressure on the enterprise's transformation, as the enterprise can transfer the pressure from the upstream of the supply chain by adjusting the price of its products (Xu & Wang, 2013). However, under the background of trade friction and technological blockade amid the wave of anti-globalization, Chinese export-oriented enterprises face more severe legitimacy disadvantages and resource access restrictions in the international market (Tan & Yang, 2021). Even the upstream of the supply chain faces the risk of disruption. In contrast, under the new development pattern of dual circulation, the home market not only creates a legitimacy advantage based on the "home field" but

also offers abundant resource endowments. This helps export-oriented enterprises achieve internal legitimacy construction and external legitimacy upgrading through institutional entrepreneurship, enabling them to acquire multiple resources in the home market. This is conducive to easing factor market pressure, reorganizing supply chain structures, and realizing transformation and upgrading. Therefore, when bargaining power is reduced, the greater the institutional distance, the easier it is for export-oriented firms to realize institutional entrepreneurship in the home market and leverage the home market advantage. On the other hand, a differentiated institutional environment can provide fertile ground for export-oriented enterprises to grow. In the home market with greater institutional distance, enterprises not only carry the relative institutional advantages of mature markets but also can leverage the comparative advantages and market potential of emerging markets (Yan & Yang, 2021). This enables enterprises to refine the knowledge and technology acquired in the international market, achieve product innovation, and enhance competitiveness, thereby increasing their bargaining power in the downstream supply chain. Therefore, the lower the bargaining power of export-oriented enterprises and the greater the institutional distance, the more enterprises tend to enter the home market to find opportunities and increase the degree of market steering. In summary, this paper proposes Hypothesis 2:

H2: Institutional distance strengthens the relationship between bargaining power and market steering for export-oriented firms.

2.3. The Moderating Role of the Nature of Property Rights

Considering China's unique institutional background, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have advantages in terms of size, capital structure, and political support, leading to significant differences between SOEs and non-SOEs in their business objectives, management models, and resource allocation (Huang & Song, 2019). Therefore, there may be differences in the relationship between firms' bargaining power and market steering based on the nature of property rights.

On the one hand, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises can receive political and financial support from the government, giving them higher bargaining power and greater resistance to the erosion of large customers. Even if SOEs face financial risks and cash flow crises in the international market due to reduced bargaining power, the government will provide financial subsidies to maintain their operations, and they are more likely to obtain credit support from financial institutions (Allen et al., 2005). This effectively mitigates the financial risks brought about by reduced bargaining power. However, the "drought and flood" support may lead SOEs to make excessive concessions in negotiations with their customers (Xu & Wang, 2013), making them more likely to maintain their international market business strategies. On the other hand, SOEs often face issues such as rigid operational models, low efficiency, and insufficient innovation (Wang et al., 2020). They are less flexible in adapting to

complex and changing external environments. Therefore, even if their bargaining power in the international market is reduced when negotiating with downstream customers in the supply chain, SOEs are likely to stick to their current business strategies due to their reliance on government support. In summary, this paper concludes that, all else being equal, the impact of bargaining power on the market strategy of state-owned enterprises is smaller than that of non-state-owned enterprises. Accordingly, Hypothesis 3 is formulated:

H3: The impact of bargaining power on market shifts in export-oriented firms is stronger in non-state-owned firms compared to state-owned firms.

3. Study Design

3.1. Sample Selection

Existing studies generally define export-oriented enterprises as those with foreign business revenue accounting for more than 50% of total business revenue (Zeng, 1994; You, 2019; Xiao et al., 2021). Therefore, this paper takes A-share listed companies in the manufacturing industry with foreign business revenue accounting for more than 50% of total business revenue from 2009 to 2020 as the research object. After excluding ST and *ST category companies, enterprises listed after 2017, and enterprises with serious missing key data, a total of 2,316 observations from 336 export-oriented listed companies are obtained. All continuous variables are then subjected to 1% and 99% quartile shrinkage. The data used in this paper are ob-

tained from the Cathay Pacific (CSMAR) database and the National Bureau of Statistics.

3.2. Description of Variables

① Explained variable: Market Shift. In this paper, export-oriented manufacturing firms refer to manufacturing firms that focus on overseas markets, where overseas sales account for more than 50% of their total sales. In the process of market steering, when a firm's share of overseas sales is less than its share of domestic sales, such firms are transformed from international market-oriented firms to domestic market-oriented firms. Domestic market-oriented firms are those firms whose domestic sales share exceeds 50% of their total sales (Fu & Yang, 2018). Based on this logic, this paper measures the degree of market shift of export-oriented manufacturing firms in terms of the ratio of domestic sales share to total sales share.

② Explanatory variable: Enterprise Bargaining Power. Based on the customer perspective, customer concentration reflects the degree of dependence of enterprises on their major customers. Since the major customers of export-oriented enterprises are concentrated in overseas markets, bargaining power based on the customer perspective can effectively capture the bargaining power of export-oriented enterprises in the international market. When customer concentration is low, firms rely less on their major customers and have stronger bargaining power in negotiations. Based on data availability, this paper adopts the proportion of the top five customers' sales to the total annual sales to measure the bargaining power of enterprises. This indicator is a negative indicator; the smaller

Table 1 | Variable definitions and descriptions

Variable type	variable name	notation	Variable definitions and descriptions
explanatory variable	market transformation	HMI	Domestic operating income/total operating income
	Bargaining power - customers	BGP	Ratio of sales from top five customers to total annual sales
moderator variable	Institutional distance	DIS	Using the of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (published by the World Banksix indices WGI) Calculated according to the relevant formula
	Nature of property rights	DMT	1 for state-owned enterprises, 0 for non-state-owned enterprises
control variable	profitability	PFT	Corporate profit before tax/total assets
	Home country government support	SUP	Natural logarithm of government grants
	Age of business	EYR	Year of observation - year of establishment of the enterprise
	market force	MAR	Natural logarithm of per capita income levels at the provincial level
	Enterprise size	SIZ	Total asset size takes the natural logarithm
	Board size	BOD	Natural logarithm of the total number of board members
	growth	GRO	Measured by growth rate of main business income
	two jobs in one	DUA	If the chairman of the enterprise is also the CEO of the enterprise, it will be recorded as 1, otherwise, it will be recorded as 0.

the value, the stronger the bargaining power of the enterprise (Zhai & Liu, 2023).

③ Moderator variable: Institutional Distance. Institutional distance usually reflects the difference between two countries or regions in terms of institutional environment, and in this paper, institutional distance specifically refers to the institutional difference between and host countries with overseas subsidiaries. Drawing on existing studies export-oriented enterprises (Mike & Vikas, 2009), this paper first measures the institutional distance between each host country and China; and uses the ratio of the number of subsidiaries in each host country to the number of all subsidiaries as the weight to calculate the weighted institutional distance. The institutional distance of each country is measured by the World Governance Indicators (WGI) published by the World Bank, which consists of six core indicators, including voice and accountability, government stability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption control (Jung et al., 2011); and the is used Euclidean distance the institutional distance to compute between The institutional distance between two countries/regions. The formula is as follows:two countries/regions.

$$ID_{ij} = \sqrt{\sum_{k=1}^N (I_{ki} - I_{kj})^2}$$

In the above equation, ID_{ij} represents the institutional distance between , where countries and i j k_i is the score of , country on institutional dimension i k_j is the score of , and country (i.e., China) on institutional dimension j N is the number of dimensions of the institutional environment.

Nature of property rights. Referring to Hu et al.the study of the nature of property rights is a dummy variable, where state-owned enterprises are 1 and non-state-owned enterprises are 0 (Hu et al., 2017).

④Control variables: with reference to existing studies (Dong & Wu, 2021; Xu et al., 2019),profitability, home country government support, market gravity, growth, board size, firm age, firm size, and two jobs are selected as control variables.

3.3. Modeling

First, in order to test the relationship between firms' bargaining power and market steering, this paper constructs shown in equation the panel data model:

$$HMI_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 BGP_{it} + \sum \alpha_k controls_{it} + \lambda_i + v(t) + \mu_{it}$$

where i represents the industry, t represents the year, α denotes the output elasticity, $controls_{it}$ denotes all control variables, λ_i represents the industry-level fixed effects, v_t represents the year-level time fixed effects, and μ_{it} denotes the residual term.

4. Empirical Analysis

4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis

In order to understand the numerical characteristics of specific variables, this paper carries out descriptive statistics and correlation analysis on the samples, as shown in

Table 2 | Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis

variant	HMI	BGP	PFT	SUP	MAR	GRO	BOD	EYR	SIZ	DIS	DMT	DUA
HMI	1											
BGP	0.0664*	1										
PFT	-0.0114	0.0113	1									
SUP	0.0415	0.1776*	0.0490*	1								
MAR	0.0451*	-0.1746*	0.0095	-0.2752*	1							
GRO	0.0867*	0.027	0.0623*	0.0359	0.1561*	1						
BOD	0.0513*	0.0165	0.0084	0.2235*	-0.0826*	0.0244	1					
EYR	.1139*	-0.0684*	0.0555*	-0.1494*	0.3189*	0.1293*	'-0.0169	1				
SIZ	0.1764*	0.0089	0.0216	0.3598*	0.1786*	0.1940*	0.3030*	0.1523*	1			
DIS	-0.0684*	0.1594*	-0.0374	0.1220*	-0.2287*	-0.0841*	-0.0444*	-0.1676*	-0.1781*	1		
DMT	0.025	0.2534*	-0.0196	0.0735*	-0.0852*	0.0546*	0.0411*	-0.0980*	-0.0144	0.0924*	1	
DUA	-0.0680*	0.0205	-0.0783*	'-0.0848*	0.0461*	-0.0073	-0.1951*	-0.0458*	-0.1312*	-0.0472*	-0.031	1
average value	0.45	0.131	0.658	15.353	10.357	'-0.401	2.118	2.788	22.011	1.48	0.517	0.373
(statistics) standard deviation	0.236	0.164	0.317	2.269	0.383	2.237	0.189	0.38	1.155	0.438	0.5	0.484

Table 2. it can be found that the bargaining power of enterprises is significantly and positively correlated level of 10% with the market steering at the and there is a significant correlation between the important explanatory variables of the model, which suggests that the explanation with these variables is feasible. In this paper, the variables were also tested for multicollinearity, with a mean value of 1.20 and a maximum value of 1.46 (consistent with a mean value of less than 5 and a maximum value of less than 10), which excludes the interference of multicollinearity.

4.2. Regression Analysis

Table 3 reports the regression results for the research hypotheses. Model 1 analyzes the regression results after adding only the core explanatory variables, Model 2 analyzes the effect of firms' bargaining power on market steering with the inclusion of only control variables; Model 3 further analyzes the regression results when time fixed effects are added; and Model 4 further controls for industry fixed effects; Models 1-Model 4 the results of all show that export-oriented firms bargaining power 'has a significant positive impact, that is, there is a significant relationship between the bargaining power of export-oriented enterprises and market steering, the lower the bargaining power, the higher the market steering. The lower the bargaining power, the higher the market steering. This verifies the research hypothesis 1.

4.3. Robustness and Endogeneity Tests

First, on the basis of fixing the time effect and industry effect, further fixing the region effect, the regression results are shown in Model 5; second, replacing the core explanatory variables. Drawing on the research of Zhang Zeyu, based on the perspective of financing constraints to measure the bargaining power of enterprises (Zhang, 2023), the SA index after taking the absolute value is used as a measure of the bargaining power of enterprises, and the greater the degree of enterprise financing constraints, the lower the bargaining power; the results are shown in Model

6; based on the perspective of the enterprise itself, the bargaining power of the enterprise represents the competitiveness of the enterprise's products. When the enterprise product competitiveness (PGP) is greater, the enterprise bargaining power is stronger, and it is more likely to obtain favorable conditions in the international market. Referring to Xu Zhijian's research, corporate bargaining power is measured by corporate gross operating margin. The larger the indicator, the stronger the bargaining power of the enterprise (Xu, 2017), and the results are shown in Model 7; third, the is used PCSE model test . This method can effectively deal with complex panel error structure, such as synchronous correlation, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, especially effective when the sample size is not large enough, allowing different cross-sections to exist in the phenomenon of heteroskedasticity, and the weights are selected to cross-section weighted, so this paper continues to use the PCSE method of estimation, and the regression results are in shown model 8.

To address the possible problem of reverse causation, this paper uses the instrumental variable method (IV method) to re-regress the variables. Specifically, referring to Sun Puyang et al.'s treatment of instrumental variables (Sun et al., 2014), the first-order lagged term of firms' bargaining power is used as an instrumental variable, and the regression is re-run using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method, and the estimation results are shown in Model 9. The results show that corporate bargaining power still has a significant effect on market steering. In addition, the value of the F-statistic of the first-stage regression is greater than the empirical value of 10, which means that there is no weak instrumental variable problem, and the P-value in the non-identification test is less than 0.01, which indicates that the original hypothesis of under-identification of instrumental variables is significantly rejected at the 1% level, suggesting that there is no non-identification problem. Therefore, the findings of this paper remain credible after using instrumental variables to deal with the endogeneity problem.

Table 3 | Benchmark regression results

Mould	1	2	3	4
	HMI	HMI	HMI	HMI
BGP	0.0958** (0.0362)	0.0924* (0.0468)	0.134** (0.0497)	0.128* (0.0526)
control variable	NO	YES	YES	YES
time effect	NO	NO	YES	YES
industry effect	NO	NO	NO	YES
Constant	0.4422*** (0.0101)	-0.812*** (0.111)	0.0168 (0.196)	0.128 (0.124)
Observations	2316	1,513	1,513	1,512
R-squared	0.004	0.094	0.117	0.137

Note:*** stands for at the passing the test significance level, 1% ** stands for passing the test at the significance level, 5% * stands for passing the test at the significance level, and are in parentheses 10% clustering robust standard errors, same below.

Table 4 | Robustness and endogeneity tests

Variables/models	5	6	7	8	9
	<i>HMI</i>	<i>HMI</i>	<i>HMI</i>	<i>HMI</i>	<i>HMI</i>
BGP	0.138** (0.0516)			0.134*** (0.0359)	0.1345* (0.0537)
PGP			0.2258*** (0.0531)		
SA index		0.0179** (0.0064)			
Phase I F-value					564.97
non-identifiability test					213.5***
control variable	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
time effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
industry effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
regional effect	YES				
Prob > chi2				0.0000	
Constant	2.538* (1.147)	-0.0081 (0.0469)	0.2145 (0.1272)	0.0381 (0.290)	0.0771 (0.2987)
Observations	1,511	1,512	1,512	1,513	1294
R-squared	0.210	0.131	0.1247	0.198	0.1863

4.4. Moderating Effects Test

Table 5 tests the moderating effect of institutional distance and property rights nature. Among them, Model 10 reports the moderating effect of institutional distance on firms' bargaining power and market steering, and from the empirical results, the coefficient of the interaction term between institutional distance and bargaining power is 0.175, which is significantly positive at 1% confidence level, indicating that institutional distance positively moderates the relationship between bargaining power and market steering; Hypothesis 2 is verified. The moderating effect of the nature of property rights was tested using group regression (Zhou & Lei, 2023), which divides the sample into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) groups. Model 11 reports the test results for the SOE group, which fails the significance test; Model 12 reports the test results for the non-SOE group, which has a significantly positive bargaining power and passes the significance test at the 10% level, suggesting that non-SOEs are more inclined to be involved in the home market when their bargaining power is reduced, and Hypothesis 3 is verified.

5. Conclusion and Outlook

Against the background of reverse globalization, facing the pressure of the upstream factor markets in the supply chain, the bargaining power of Chinese export-oriented enterprises in the international market is getting weaker and weaker, and the enterprises urgently need to strategically transform to cope with this change. The home market has become a new window of opportunity for Chinese export-oriented enterprises under the . So, will the weakening of bargaining power drive export-oriented enterprises to shift from international market strategy to home market strategy, and then reach the home country advantage? To this end, this paper focuses on the relationship between the customer-based bargaining power of export-oriented firms and market shifting, and new development pattern of double-cycle empirically examines the mechanism of the impact of firms' bargaining power on market shifting by utilizing the panel data of listed firms, and draws the following research in several aspects conclusions. First, there is a significant positive relationship between bargaining power and market steering in export-oriented enterprises, i.e., the lower the bargaining power, the higher the degree of market steering; second, the relationship between bargaining power and market steering is moderated by institutional distance and the nature of property rights, in which the institutional distance strengthens the positive relationship

Table 5 | Moderating effects test

Variables/models	10 full sample HMI	11 state enterprise HMI	12 non-state enterprise HMI
BGP	0.156** (0.0463)	0.0839 (0.0552)	0.147* (0.0740)
BGP*DIS	0.175*** (0.0318)		
DIS	0.0078 (0.0346)		
control variable	YES	YES	YES
time effect	YES	YES	YES
industry effect	YES	YES	YES
Constant	-0.366** (0.108)	0.161 (0.520)	0.166 (0.430)
Observations	1,357	581	930
R-squared	0.148	0.190	0.133

between bargaining power and market steering, and the compared with state-owned enterprises. impact of bargaining power on market steering is stronger in non-state-owned enterprises. The impact of bargaining power on market steering is stronger in non-state-owned firms compared to state-owned firms.

The theoretical value of this paper is twofold. First, unlike the existing research on market steering of export-oriented enterprises based on the perspectives of efficiency and legitimacy (Ding, 2022), this paper focuses on the perspective of bargaining power of supply chain firms, and based on the special background of anti-globalization and China's new development pattern of double-cycle, it proposes and examines the relationship between the bargaining power of export-oriented firms and market steering, and finds that, based on the customer perspective of the reduction of bargaining power can significantly. It is found that the reduction of bargaining power based on the customer perspective can significantly affect the degree of market steering of enterprises. The research idea and related findings of this paper are more in line with the current situation of China's export-oriented enterprises and have more theoretical explanatory power, which is a useful attempt to further expand the theoretical framework of reverse internationalization of multinational enterprises in emerging markets. Second, this paper echoes the academic in predicting corporate call to and expands corporate emphasize the importance of organizational contextual factors strategic transitions (Xie et al., 2016) the research on mechanisms. By examining country-level institutional differences the boundary of bargaining power the relationship between, this paper constitutes a useful complement to the previous research on reverse internationalization of firms, and to a certain extent, promotes the in-depth re-

search on home country market strategies. and firm-level property rights differences on bargaining power and firms' market shifts

The results of this paper for have important practical implications both and governments. export-oriented enterprises For the Chinese government, continuing to deepen the new development pattern of the double cycle and creating a dominant resource base and legitimizing atmosphere in are the attract export-oriented enterprises the domestic market core strategies to back to China. Further promoting the construction of a unified national market, breaking down multiple factor barriers to unleash the potential of the domestic market, and at the same time creating a globally oriented and fully open market environment are also key paths to enhance the attractiveness of the Chinese market. For export-oriented enterprises, it is important to pay full attention to the huge opportunities brought by the development of the home market under the new development pattern of double-cycle. When the strategy is blocked internationalization, they should take advantage of the of the new development pattern of the strategic dividend and make use of the domestic market to achieve high-end double cycle development.

There are also research deficiencies in this paper, which also points out the direction of future research. First, this paper simply measures the degree of market steering of export-oriented enterprises from the perspective of trade by the percentage of sales in the domestic market, and future research can try to use text analysis to construct market steering indexes of export-oriented enterprises from different dimensions, so as to better portray the degree of market steering of export-oriented enterprises in the context of anti-globalization; second, due to the limitation of data availability, this paper does not consider the

impact of bargaining power on market steering of China's export-oriented enterprises against international suppliers. Second, due to the limitation of data availability, this paper does not consider the impact of the bargaining power of Chinese export-oriented firms on market steering against international suppliers. In the context of decoupling and chain breakage, the impact of bargaining power on market steering brought about by changes in the upstream of the supply chain is likely to be more significant; third, the behavior of Chinese export-oriented firms after becoming involved in their home markets is examined. The process of upgrading competitiveness through market steering and utilizing the home market is a process of organizational change, which requires firms to make adjustments in organizational culture and organizational capabilities. In the future, the case study method can be further adopted to reveal the micro-mechanisms of Chinese export-oriented enterprises utilizing the home market to achieve high-end development.

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